INFRASTRUCTURE AND SUPPORT NETWORKS IN RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS
Doctrinally speaking, the infrastructure of a resistance movement encompasses the physical structures of the area complex and guerrilla bases. The “area complex” is defined as a clandestine, dispersed network of physical facilities to support the resistance activities in a given conflict zone. It is not comprised of such facilities in a liberated zone, but rather hidden/clandestine facilities in contested or denied territory. Such a clandestine infrastructure allows the resistance a small measure of freedom of movement and the ability to operate effectively in such areas because of the support networks available throughout an area of operations. In order to adequately support resistance activities, this area complex should include security system networks, guerrilla bases/camps, logistics, communications, and medical facilities and networks, information operations (IO) networks, and a transportation network capable of moving personnel and materials throughout denied/contested areas without being compromised or intercepted by regime security forces.

The guerrilla base is an encampment or, more typically, a series of encampments close to one another, which afford the paramilitary guerrilla force the support necessary to rest, recuperate, and plan and train for future operations. Guerrilla bases may be either a temporary or semi-permanent facility, ranging from a couple of tents in the timber, a couple of caves in high alpine canyons, to a complete village in a remote mountain valley. The differences in variation from one encampment to the next will be dependent mostly on the security situation.

The security situation is a combination of the force’s ability to receive warning of any impending enemy attack, the enemy’s ability to project force into the area of the guerrilla base, and the guerrillas’ ability to minimize their signature in order to prevent detection or location by regime security force intelligence elements. The guerrilla base will, necessarily, be located in those areas that are not readily accessible to the regime’s security forces, such as thick, timbered swamps/jungle, high alpine areas, or heavily built-up, restricted urban areas. Security for these bases in dependent on a tiered approach consisting of the inner security zone, outer security network, and other personnel networks of the subversive underground and auxiliary.

The inner security zone encompasses the typical camp security processes common to any military outpost/encampment. These include static guard and sentry positions, listening posts/observation posts (LP/OPs) at some remove from the encampment, and roving security patrols to interdict potential enemy movements into the area of the guerrilla base. All security elements should have a secure, effective, and coordinated means of signaling and communicating with each other, as well as the guerrilla base tactical operations center (TOC), as well as clear, concise instructions on courses of action to follow in order to respond to different threats. Doctrinally offered in the form of general and standing orders, five-paragraph operations orders (OPORD), and/or fragmentary orders (FRAGO), these instructions should include, but not necessarily be limited to, plans for rapid evacuation and withdrawal of all personnel and critical equipment, subsequent dispersal and re-organization plans, and guidance for a dedicated stay-behind element to delay pursuit by enemy forces. Pre-positioned fighting positions, obstacles, command- and/or personnel-detonated anti-personnel devices (IED/EFPs, mines, booby-traps, etc.), pre-established ambush positions, and other elements, may support these plans It is critical that the guerrilla force stay-behind elements not allow themselves to become decisively engaged while carrying out these delaying/harassing defensive skirmisher duties.

The outer security network consists of multiple networks of subversive underground and auxiliary agents with secure, clandestine lines of communications to the guerrilla base that perform both passive and active surveillance of possible impending enemy operations against the guerrilla base.

Key indicators that network agents might be taught to look for may include, but again, are certainly not limited to, unusual build ups of numbers of enemy combat troops, arrival of special operations units, unsecured radio and/or telephone conversations, over-flight of reconnaissance/surveillance and/or assault air assets, or movement of ground-mobile assault elements into the vicinity of the guerrilla base area.

The utilization of multiple, redundant collection and communications methods by the resistance for this purpose, provides the guerrilla force with significant leverage in the information operations spectrum that allows it to continue to maintain a created advantage of leverage over enemy security forces.

As with any combat operations unit, a resistance movement must develop a unique logistics support system network to supply the material needs of its combat forces, based on the METT-TC-specific demands of their situation. Generally speaking however, a resistance movement meets its logistical requirements through both internal and external methods.

The area complex must provide the bulk of the logistics requirements necessary to sustain the resistance, through procurement from the local civilian populace and battlefield recovery. This is the embodiment of Mao’s classic admonition to be a “fish in the sea of the people.” Nevertheless, considering the depredations suffered by the civilian populace as a result of on-going combat operations, underground subversion, and/or regime security force reprisals, the resistance must strive to successfully balance its logistics support requirements, with the necessity for cooperation, goodwill, and active and latent support from the civilian populace. Any provisioning from the populace MUST be voluntary, and the citizen must be adequately and fairly compensated for his support.

Imposing demands on an already beleaguered population will almost certainly have negative consequences on popular support. The traditional method of levying taxes on the civilian populace, to “support a resistance shadow government,” will result in the loss of support, and potential compromise by disgruntled citizens. This type of logistics support issue may initially dictate the size of resistance organizations that can be supported in a given area of operations/conflict zone.

Once a resistance effort has outgrown the ability of the area complex to provide the requisite logistics support, historically, external sponsors have steeped in to help alleviate these demands. For the future resistance movement however, it is almost certainly fair to assume that any external support will come from black market operations and smuggling across international borders or through enemy lines of control.

Other methods of logistics support within the area complex and conflict zone may include: purchase on the open market by operatives or auxiliaries of the subversive underground, and production within the facilities of the area complex. Finally, the option may be considered, of confiscating materials from the civilian populace reliably identified as being unalterably aligned with the regime. This method however, has numerous severe drawbacks, as it is often misused by elements of the civilian populace and/or the auxiliary to even personal vendettas against actually unaligned members of the populace, driving them away from the resistance. It may degenerate into random looting of non-military essential personal items by resistance members as well, further widening a divide between the movement and the civilian populace. Finally, regardless of the moral justification arguments that may be made, it is ultimately and undeniably theft, and leads to a degradation of the morality of the values of a resistance movement.

It should be the goal of the subversive undergrounds, in the formative stages of a resistance, to acquire and store, for later disbursement, large quantities of supplies. This will necessarily be accomplished without the “benefits” of conventional lines of supply and communication. This is managed by the creation and maintenance of a de-centralized system of planned, dispersed caches hidden across a broad area of the conflict zone, rather than large, centralized warehouses that are susceptible to compromise and destruction by regime security forces.

This will minimize the loss of material if the guerrilla base is over-run, or the location of some caches is compromised. This system of widely dispersed re-supply caches will facilitate combat operations across a wide region, without relying on a long, vulnerable support train.

Resistance elements need to be able to communicate reliably with one another, as well as with subordinate elements, in areas where technologically superior enemy forces will be actively hunting them with all means available, including signals intercept (“eavesdropping”). Any communications methods that would compromise the locations or identities of resistance personnel or auxiliary support mechanisms would be catastrophic. This type of communications security (COMSEC) violation has been directly responsible for the targeting and killing of enemy Islamist high-value targets (HVTs) in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.

While the use of technological communications such as internet, cell phones, and two-way radios should be leveraged to the advantage of the resistance (methods for secure COMSEC with these tools will be explored in a future article), do not overlook the security advantages of non-technical communications for the sake of convenience. The resistance should, prior to the commencement of active operations against the regime, establish a system of dead drops, recognized codes for clandestine communications, such as far and near recognition signals, and a network of couriers and messengers among the auxiliary.

The resistance will require an ability to transport personnel and logistics through enemy-controlled territory. While the romantic image of a pack string of horses or mules, struggling through high mountain passes is certainly a realistic option in some cases, such as areas where roads are underdeveloped or non-existent (we made widespread use of them in the early days of the GWOT in Afghanistan), in most cases it is far more efficient to move large amounts of goods and personnel via trucks or cars.

A resistance transportation network should include a strictly compartmentalized series of safe-houses or secure hiding places and caches that will facilitate the transport of personnel or supplies over long distances, always under the guidance of trusted local cadres who are familiar with the local enemy security procedures. Security within the transportation network will require a complex and detailed system of far and near recognition signals, and communications that allow individual cells of the network to make transfers safely, with minimal exposure of either compartment to another.

(Critical Note: A successful transportation network will also facilitate the evacuation of wounded personnel and may help potential recruits to the resistance escape and evade enemy capture.)

Irregular warfare, especially in the guise of a resistance movement intended to overthrow or coerce an established regime, is fundamentally psychological in execution and effect. For this reason, it is absolutely critical to integrate information operations to support all operations of the resistance. Networks must be developed to provide information and assistance to the civilian populace, in order to bolster the will of the populace to support the resistance.

IO can be utilized to develop, maintain, and reinforce desired behaviors within the civilian populace, as well as undermining the morale of regime military and security personnel. The critical element in utilizing IO to garner support from the civilian populace is to ensure that populations within the conflict zone understand that the resistance is fighting for their benefit, even if it is not immediately evident. A failure of this PSYOP aspect of IO leaves the resistance’s overall efforts susceptible to the enemy’s efforts to undermine civilian support of even the most well-planned and executed combat operations.

The greatest impact of PSYOP on the civilian populace will be accomplished by face-to-face interaction between members of the resistance and members of the civilian populace. Nevertheless, it is critically important for the resistance to develop a cadre of personnel to direct IO efforts.

The specific missions of this cadre may include:

· Identifying critical key psychological attitudes amongst the civilian populace in the conflict zone, regarding the regime, the resistance, and the impact of operations on their daily lives.

· Providing training and advisory assistance to key leadership at all levels regarding the development, organization, and employment of various IO activities.

· Providing efforts to shape popular perceptions within the civilian populace that support resistance movement activities.

· Providing efforts to counter enemy mis-information and dis-information campaigns that may be inimical to resistance movement aims.

· Developing methods to allow the resistance to mitigate the suffering of the civilian populace, in a manner that does not overly tie the population to the resistance, thereby risking retaliation against the civilian populace by regime security forces.

· Analyzing the impact of resistance operations on the civilian populace and provide support to key leaders/elements to mitigate any negative impact.

· Providing direct support and/or training to resistance elements in developing relationships with official and unofficial leadership elements within the civilian populace.

These IO activities, the responsibility of Civil Affairs branch personnel in the conventional military will, ultimately, be the responsibility of every member of the resistance. The establishment of a network of an expert IO cadre will allow for the possibility of providing these activities prior to training resistance members. Additionally, the development of this cadre in the initial stages of resistance will help shape the popular opinion within the civilian populace to benefit the resistance from the beginning stages of the resistance.

Nous Defions!

John Mosby

Somewhere in the mountains.