The debate over the morality and legality of targeted killing has been rekindled by the death of Osama Bin Laden and shows no sign of stopping. But most of the debaters have overlooked a key point. If it is moral and legal to individually target uniformed enemy military officers, surely the same goes for leaders of terrorist organizations. It cannot be the case that law and morality give the latter greater protection than the former. I made this point in a recent statement that got quoted by Al Jazeera (not a media outlet that I would ever have expected to be cited by, but they asked me to comment, so I did):
Ilya Somin, a professor at George Mason University’s School of Law, echoed Greenberg’s argument that “targeting individual enemy combatants in war is perfectly legal and moral”.
Somin points at US targeting of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the commander of the Japanese fleet during World War II, and the British and the Czechs’ killing of German SS General Reinhard Heydrick [sic] in 1942, as precedents.
“Surely international law does not give terrorist leaders greater protection than that enjoyed by uniformed soldiers such as Admiral Yamamoto.”
“And if it is legal to individually target the commander of a uniformed military force, it is surely equally legal to target the leader of a terrorist organisation, including Osama bin Laden,” he told Al Jazeera.
To my knowledge, hardly any serious commentators claim that the targeted killing of enemy military commanders such as Yamamoto and Heydrich is either illegal or immoral. With the possible exception of Justice John Paul Stevens (who questioned the morality of the Yamamoto attack, but not its legality), everyone understands that individual military officers are legitimate targets. A capable high-ranking officer is a military asset in much the same way as an individual anonymous mass of low-ranking soldiers. In Heydrich’s case, there is the complicating factor that, as one of the architects of the Holocaust, he was an even greater criminal than Bin Laden. However, this was not the reason why he was targeted for assassination by the Allies (who in early 1942 did not yet know of his crucial role in the Holocaust). And Admiral Yamamoto was not guilty of committing any atrocities; the US targeted him simply because he was a more effective commander than his likely replacements.
What is true of uniformed officers surely also applies to leaders of terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda. The latter, too, represent enemy military assets that we can legitimately target in wartime. If anything, targeting terrorist leaders is more defensible than targeting individual uniformed officers. Unlike uniformed soldiers, terrorist leaders openly target civilians and don’t even pretend to obey the laws of war.
The only significant countervailing consideration is that terrorists are sometimes more difficult to distinguish from innocent civilians than military officers are. This creates the danger that unscrupulous governments will use bogus accusations of terrorism as a justification for killing people they dislike. This is a genuine problem. But it doesn’t justify a categorical ban on the targeted killing of terrorists. Instead, such abuses can be constrained in two other ways.
First, targeted killings, like other military tactics, can only be used against terrorists in conflicts that are large-scale enough to qualify as a war. One can legitimately debate the exact point at which a terrorist threat rises to that status. But surely al Qaeda, given the enormous scale of its atrocities, qualifies. The boundary between war and small-scale conflict is also disputable in the case of traditional armed confrontations between states, as the recent debate over the US military intervention in Libya demonstrates. As with many legal concepts, the boundary between “war” and other types of conflict is difficult to define with absolute precision. But most real-world cases are clear enough to readily be classified on one side of the line or the other.
Even when we do have an antiterrorist conflict that qualifies as a war, the deliberate targeting of innocent people under a pretextual accusation of terrorism can still be prosecuted as a war crime. In the same way, officials can be prosecuted for deliberately bombing a civilian target under a bogus claim that it is actually an enemy military unit. No one argues that the use of air strikes or artillery against military targets is categorically illegal or unjust merely because governments sometimes use bogus military rationales to justify attacks on civilians. The same reasoning applies to the abuse of targeted killings.
Sometimes, of course, a targeted killing may end up killing innocent people even though the government that ordered the operation genuinely believed that they were attacking a terrorist. But the same risk is present in conventional military operations against uniformed soldiers. Indeed, far more innocent civilians have been accidentally killed by air and artillery attacks aimed at military units than by targeted killing operations gone awry.
In sum, if we assume that the targeted killing of enemy military personnel is a legal and moral tactic in wartime, the same reasoning also justifies the targeted killing of terrorists.